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REVIEW
NLRB ELECTION LAW
Cornelius J. Peck*
UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND
REALITY. By Julius G. Getman, Stephen B. Goldberg, and Jeanne
B. Herman. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976. Pp. xvii, 218.
$7.00.
Much of what follows might have been written as a comment on
Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.,' a recent decision of the National
Labor Relations Board, which in turn has many qualities of a review
of Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality. In Shopping
Kart, a divided Board overruled a well-established principle of NLRB
election law on the basis of empirical evidence published in the book,
a type of evidence for which the Board had previously demonstrated
little concern. Thus, the significance of the book and the success of
the authors' empirical study has been promptly established.
The rules of NLRB election law were developed by the Board in
cases in which it concluded that conduct of the parties or others so
interfered with the freedom of choice of employees that the election
results were not an acceptable indication of the employees' desire con-
cerning union representation. Proceeding case by case, the Board re-
lied upon hunches of various Board members as to the effect of var-
ious types of conduct upon employee freedom of choice.2 Instead of
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.S., 1944 Harvard University;
L.L.B., 1949, Harvard Law School.
1. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (Apr. 8, 1977). In its opinion in
Shopping Kart, the majority relied upon a law review article which summarized data
later published in the book reviewed here. Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assump-
tions Underlying NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical
Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1976). The dissenting opinion of Member Jenkins
cites the book, making it apparent that the book and its more comprehensive report
of the study had been called to the attention of the Board. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, at
24 n.37, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1712 n.37.
2. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also R. WILLIAMS,
P. JANUS, & K. HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (Labor Relations
and Public Policy Series, Report No. 8, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania 1974) [hereinafter cited as REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT].
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attempting to determine the actual effect of the challenged conduct
upon employees, the Board has been concerned only with whether it
was reasonable to conclude that the conduct tended to prevent free
formation and expression of the employees' choice.3 Indeed, the
Board denied the authors' request for lists of addresses of employees
who would be eligible to vote in scheduled elections upon the ground,
among others, that the proposed study would be likely to upset the
"laboratory conditions" deemed necessary for elections and would
otherwise result in delays inconsistent with the policy of the National
Labor Relations Act.4 These lists were obtained by the authors only
after suit under the Freedom of Information Act.5
Commentators had earlier noted the lack of empirical data to sup-
port the hypotheses underlying the Board's election rules and sug-
gested that some of the hypotheses were both wrong and contrary to
the effects actually produced by the conduct in question.6 Their que-
ries, however, failed to produce a change in the Board's way of making
policy decisions. Related to the Board's lack of interest in empirical
data is its fixation upon adjudication as the process for development
of policy, despite criticism by courts and neutral observers that it has
failed to make use of its rulemaking powers. 7 Adjudication focuses
attention upon the evidence establishing the facts in a particular con-
troversy and consigns to the area of irrelevancy evidence from which
principles of general applicability could be formulated. Judicial deci-
sions relying on rules are usually written without record evidence to
support the hypotheses upon which the rules are based-e.g., that
3. 33 NLRB ANN. REP. 60 (1968). See Shovel Supply Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 315,
316(1957).
4. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
5. Id.
6. REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT, supra note 2, at 37, 57, 59, 166, 193, 242
255, 440; Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 36, 46-53, 88-92, 112-16
(1964); Murphy, The National Labor Relations Board-An Appraisal, 52 MINN.
L. REV. 819, 843 (1968); Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6
SYRACUSE L. REV. 93, 106-08 (1954).
7. NLRB v. Wyman Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); NLRB v. Lorben Corp.,
345 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J., dissenting); Bernstein, The NLRB's
Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79
YALE LJ. 571 (1970); Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board's
Performance in Policy Formation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 254 (1968); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Shapiro, Choice of Rule-Making or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921
(1965); Summers, supra note 6, at 107-08.
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suits by children against parents will or will not disrupt domestic tran-
quility. Adherence to that model suggests that empirical studies are
unnecessary. On behalf of the NLRB it should be noted that in its
early years it had a Division of Economic Research which conducted
investigations extending beyond the scope of particular cases,8 but
that division was abolished in 1940 pursuant to the provisions of a
rider attached to a supplemental appropriation bill.9 That prohibition
was made permanent in 1947 by a provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, 10
apparently because of a belief that subversive persons advising the
Board could influence the course of investigation."
Based upon their review of NLRB decisions, the authors identified
and formulated six major assumptions upon which the Board's rules
of election law are based. Obviously, others might have stated these
assumptions in somewhat different terms and with greater or lesser
breadth for the individual propositions. Nevertheless, the authors'
statements of the Board's assumptions appear to be correct summari-
zations and they are supported by NLRB case law. 12 They are as fol-
lows:13
(1) employees are attentive to the campaign;
(2) employees will interpret ambiguous statements by the employer as
threats or promises;
(3) employees are unsophisticated about labor relations;
(4) free choice is fragile, but unless reminded of the employer's eco-
nomic power, employees will not fully appreciate the possibility of
its use to oppose unionization. Once reminded of that power by
8. 4NLRB ANN. REP. 155-57 (1939); 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 250-51 (1938).
9. Act of Oct. 9, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-812, ch. 780, 54 Stat. 1030, 1037
(1940); see 5 NLRB ANN. REP. 9 (1940).
10. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch. 120 §
101, 61 Stat. 140 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1970)).
11. Murphy, supra note 6, at 843.
12. The recent and comprehensive study conducted by Williams, Janus, and
Huhn, REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT, supra note 2, does not use the same
formulations of these assumed premises, but nothing in that report suggests that
the authors erred in* their formulations. The Williams group criticizes the Board
with some frequency for proceeding upon premises which favor unions and limit
employer freedom of speech, which they believe Congress intended to protect,
e.g., id. at 55-56, 92, 101, 135, 240-42, whereas the authors' objective inquiry
does not involve them in such an evaluation of the political purposes which might
be served by the rules. This difference does not, however, constitute a conflict be-
tween the studies with respect to the assumptions upon which the Board's rules are
based.
13. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAW AND REALITY 7-21 (1976) [hereinafter cited without further cross-reference as
GETMAN STUDY].
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threats, promises, or their effectuation, employees will vote against
the union;
(5) except in unusual circumstances, a union is not at an impermis-
sible disadvantage in presenting its views to employees through
solicitation during non-working hours and traditional off-premises
channels of communication;
(6) (a) an employee who signs a union authorization card does so be-
cause he wishes union representation, unless the solicitor repre-
sents expressedly or impliedly that the sole purpose of the card is
to obtain an election; (b) the decision to sign an authorization card
does not involve the same careful informed consideration as the
voting decisions; (c) an employee who does not sign an authoriza-
tion card does not wish union representation.
To test these assumptions, the authors studied thirty-one elections
held by the NLRB during 1972 and 1973.14 The unions won eight
and lost twenty-three of the elections. Working with a staff of forty-
three interviewers, the authors contacted and completed interviews
with more than 1,200 employees, using a random sample of one-third
of the employees in bargaining units larger than twenty-five. 15 Care
was exercised to avoid distortion arising from the types of elections
studied.' 6 The first wave of interviews (Wave I) took place as soon as
possible after the direction that an election be held and at least ten
days before the election. 17 The second wave of interviews (Wave II)
took place immediately after the election.' 8 The primary purpose of
the Wave I interviews was to determine the pre-campaign sentiments
of employees concerning union representation. The Wave II interviews
were an attempt to ascertain what the employees remembered of the
14. ld. at 33.
15. Id. at 33, 37, 47.
16. The number of the voters in the bargaining units studied varied from four
to just about four hundred; the employers involved were engaged in a broad
range of business activities; and the elections took place in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Missouri, and Kentucky in communities ranging in size from a town of 1,255 to
cities the size of Chicago and St. Paul. Id. at 35-36. In the Wave I interviews,
employees were asked the sensitive question whether they had signed a union card.
Union records revealed that the question was answered correctly by 85% of those
who said they had and by 89% of those who said they had not. Id. at 42. Never-
theless, several important questions may be raised whether there was a distortion
produced by studying elections at companies whose labor relations policies made
it possible to predict that there would be vigorous and possibly unlawful cam-
paigning. See note 76 and accompanying text infra.
17. GETMAN STUDY, at 33-34.
18. Id. at 33.
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content of the campaign, how they voted, and why.19
The results of the study indicate that the NLRB has been wrong in
almost all of its assumptions concerning employee behavior. Em-
ployees are not generally attentive to the campaign. The average em-
ployee remembered less than ten percent of the company's campaign
issues and seven percent of the union's issues. No company issue was
remembered by more than forty percent of the employees. A union
theme of improved wages was recalled by seventy-one percent of the
employees, and a union theme that it would prevent unfairness was
recalled by sixty-four percent of the employees. Only twenty-two per-
cent of the employees could recall, within ten percent of the correct
figure, the amount of wages a union claimed to have obtained from
employers elsewhere. Regardless of the number of issues raised in the
campaigns, employees recalled an average of only three company is-
sues and between two and three union issues.20
The authors conclude that the NLRB has been correct in assuming
that some employees will interpret ambiguous statements as threats or
promises, but has been in error as to the type of employees who will
give such interpretations and as to the effect of these statements on
employee voting behavior. For instance, fewer company voters than
union voters reported that there had been a job-loss theme.21 Thirty-
four percent of the employees intending to vote for the union reported
reprisals by the employer for union activity, whereas only ten percent
of those intending to vote for the company reported such conduct;
unlawful benefits were reported by thirty-one percent of those in-
tending to vote union, but only nineteen percent of those intending to
vote for the company. 22 In eight elections, union supporters were dis-
charged during the card-signing campaign, but it was primarily union
supporters, not company supporters, who tended to view the dis-
charges as having been motivated by anti-union sentiment.23 Never-
19. Id.
20. Id. at 75-83.
21. Id. at 87. Only 24% of the company voters reported a job loss theme,
whereas 47% of the union voters reported such a theme.
The authors defined job-loss themes as "employer campaign themes raising the
possibility that a union victory might result in employees losing their jobs due to
plant closing, strikes, discharges, or layoffs." Id. Thus, an employer suggestion
that unionization would reduce efficiency, raise costs, weaken the company's com-
petitive position, and thereby cause a loss of jobs, would qualify as a job-loss
theme.
22. Id. at 121-22.
23. Id. at 126-27.
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theless, no more card-signers switched to vote for the company in
these elections than in other elections in which union supporters were
not discharged, thus indicating that union supporters were not coerced
into changing their votes because of what they viewed as discrimina-
tory conduct. 24 Illegal interrogation of employees was, according to
the authors, a matter of little concern to union supporters, forty-three
percent of whom thought the employer knew their position on unioni-
zation. 25 The authors suggest that employees susceptible to coercion
may have succumbed to that pressure before the pre-election cam-
paign, whereas those employees favorably disposed toward the union
are aware of the employer's economic power and view threats or re-
prisals as confirmation of the need for a union. 26
The basic assumption of the NLRB that employees are unsophisti-
cated about unionization and thus are susceptible to influence is not
supported by the data concerning employee involvement with unions.
Forty-three percent of the employees interviewed had been union
members on other jobs; seventy-five percent reported that an imme-
diate member of the family had been a union member; and thirty per-
cent had voted in a previous NLRB election.2 7 What happens during
an election campaign was much less likely to determine an employee's
vote than his predisposition toward unions. The votes of eighty-one
percent of the employees could be predicted from their pre-campaign
attitudes toward unions and their jobs, and from their intent before
the campaign to vote for or against the union.28
Of the nineteen percent who did not vote in accordance with their
predisposition, six percent were undecided, leaving thirteen percent
in the category of persons who switched their vote from their origi-
nally stated intent. The votes of the undecideds and the switchers deter-
mined the results of nine of the thirty-one elections. 29 The votes of this
nineteen percent thus determined almost one third of the elections,
making study of the effects of the campaign on this group of partic-
ular importance. Persons who were initially undecided and then voted
for the union or persons who switched from a company intent to
24. Id. at 127.
25. Id. at 121-29.
26. Id. at 128-29.
27. Id. at 66.
28. Id. at 60-62.
29. Id. at 103.
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voting for the union knew more about the union's campaign than
those who voted for the company, whereas those who were initially
undecided and then voted for the company were no more familiar
with its campaign than were the union voters. 30 Those who switched
from an intention to vote union to voting for the company were like-
wise no more familiar with the company's campaign than those who
voted for the union.31 The apparent reason that the undecideds and
switchers who voted for the union knew more about the union's cam-
paign was that they had attended union meetings more frequently.3 2
The absence of greater familiarity with the company's campaign on
the part of switchers or undecideds who voted for the company thus
suggests that the company's campaign does not play as important a
part in determining the election as attendance at union meetings, but
the fact that seventy-six percent of the switchers and sixty-eight per-
cent of undecideds voted for the company3 3 cautions against dis-
counting the importance of that campaign.34 The authors suggest that
the employer's campaign may encourage employees to reconsider
their initial decision to support the union or that it may demonstrate
to employees that the employer is aware of causes of employee dissat-
isfaction and should be allowed an opportunity to eliminate them.3
5
The latter explanation is consistent with an earlier finding concerning
the success of a theme that the company was new or management had
recently been taken over,36 which suggested it should be given a
chance to improve.
The importance of attendance at union meetings in creating famil-
iarity with union issues is supported by the findings that attendance at
meetings is more strongly related to familiarity with issues than is re-
ceipt of written material. 37 Employers were substantially more suc-
cessful than unions in getting employees to attend meetings, and most
of the employees attending union meetings were already union sup-
30. Id.
31. Id. at 103-04.
32. Id. at 104.
33. Id. at 107.
34. It has been suggested that employee inertia might explain the high per-
centage of company votes from switchers and undecideds. See Eames, An Analysis
of the Union Voting Study from a Trade-Unionist's Point of View, 28 STAN. L. REv.
1181 (1976).
35. GETMAN STUDy, at 108.
36. Id. at 76.
37. Id.at9l.
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porters. 38 The chief reasons why employees did not attend union
meetings were (1) meetings held at an inconvenient time or place
(forty percent), (2) lack of interest in the union (twenty-nine percent),
and (3) not knowing about the meeting (nine percent). Personal con-
tact also bore a significant relationship to campaign familiarity. 39
These findings led the authors to conclude that the union is at a
substantial disadvantage when the employer can hold meetings on
company time and the union cannot.40 This conclusion is at odds,
however, with the answer given by the Board to the Supreme Court's
query in NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America (Nutone, Inc.)41
whether such use of company time for campaigning created an imbal-
ance in the opportunities for organizational campaigning. The Board's
conclusion has been that such an imbalance is not created unless there
are unusual circumstances, as when employees are isolated by
working on board a ship,42 or when the company has enforced a
broad and unlawful no-solicitation rule43 or a broad, but privileged,
no-solicitation rule.44
The authors found a high correlation existed between campaign
themes and the reasons given by employees for their votes.45 They at-
tribute this, not to the efficacy of the campaign, but to the general
predispositions of the voters and their acceptance of campaign issues
consistent with those predispositions.46 A separate analysis of the
switchers' reasons for changing their positions to determine if cam-
paign issues affected their decisions proved to be fruitless. 47 The au-
thors conclude that only the few employees who were initially com-
pany supporters but switched and voted for the union fit the NLRB's
38. Id. at 92. Eighty-three percent of the employees interviewed had attended
company meetings; only 36% had attended union meetings.
39. Id. at 93.
40. Id. at 96.
41. 357 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1958).
42. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 382 (1971),
enforcement denied, 472 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1973); cf. Alaska Barite Co., 197
N.L.R.B. 1023 (1972) (island); S. & H. Grossinger's Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 233 (1965)
(hotel).
43. Montgomery Ward & Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964).
44. May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), enforcement denied, 316
F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
45. GETMAN STUDY, at 97. Eighty-four percent of the reasons given by union
voters and 7 1% of the reasons given by company voters were issues in the cam-
paign.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 98.
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stereotype of employees who are convinced by the issues in a cam-
paign. 48
Ordinarily a union establishes its status as a bargaining representa-
tive by obtaining the vote of a majority of the employees voting in an
NLRB election. Data produced by this study is of significance with
regard to the question when a company may be ordered to bargain
with a union because the union has obtained cards signed by a ma-
jority of the employees. An employer who has not engaged in un-
lawful pre-election conduct need not bargain with a union on the basis
of signed authorization cards, but may instead insist upon an NLRB
election.49 But an employer who has engaged in such conduct may be
ordered to bargain with a union which has obtained authorization
cards from a majority of the employees if it is concluded that the un-
fair labor practices make impossible the holding of a fair election.5 0
These holdings have given rise to controversy as to the reliability of
union authorization cards as indicators of employee preferences. The
data suggested to the authors that union authorization cards are reli-
able indicators of employee choice at the time the card is signed, and
that refusal to sign a card generally represents opposition to the union
or uncertainty concerning the benefits of union representation.51 The
data revealed, however, that union authorization cards were inac-
curate predictors of actual voting behavior for approximately one-
quarter of the voters. Seventy-two percent of the card signers ulti-
mately voted for union representation, whereas seventy-nine percent
of the non-signers voted against the union.52 The inaccuracy of voting
predictions based upon union authorization cards indicates that the
NLRB and the courts are correct in considering elections to be the
preferred method for determining employee desires concerning union
representation. For those committed to the importance of providing
an opportunity for the company to present its views before employees
accept union representation, the data significantly demonstrated that
in most of the elections in which it was possible to make the determi-
nation, the company did not know about the card-signing campaign in
time to respond to it.53
48. Id. at 141.
49. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
50. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
51. GETMAN STuDy, at 132.
52. Id. at 133.
53. Jd. at 135.
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These conclusions of the authors were undoubtedly a surprise to
many experienced persons in the field of labor relations, particularly
because the findings of this study are inconsistent with long held
NLRB assumptions. Perhaps it is familiarity with the assumptions
underlying the NLRB's election rules that leads such persons to con-
clude that there are basic but undetected errors underlying the study.
A symposium of such experts discussing the book illustrates this
view.54 Board member Jenkins, dissenting from the Shopping Kart
majority's acceptance of the study as a basis for overturning a Board
election rule, characterized the work as based upon "nonprobative
factual data and non sequitur logic." 55 He was apparently convinced
that his intuition provided a surer ground for adhering to the rule.
I suggest that the principal causes of a variance between the
hunches of persons familiar with labor relations and the results of the
study are to be found in the types of companies studied and the late
date at which the first interviews were conducted. As mentioned
above, the Wave I interviews took place as soon as possible after the
direction of an election and at least ten days before the elections. 56
One hesitates in reviewing a book such as this to make statements
without supporting empirical data. Nevertheless, I suggest that unions
ordinarily do not file a petition for an election among employees of an
unorganized company until they have engaged in a considerable
amount of organizational work. At the minimum, the NLRB requires
as a condition of holding an election that the union has signed author-
ization cards from thirty percent of the employees in the bargaining
unit which it wishes to represent. 57 Moreover, common sense dictates
that the union file its petition at a time when it believes its orches-
trated organizational efforts will reach a culmination near the date of
the election. Most elections take place pursuant to consent agreements
of the parties. 58 The authors state-but without citation-that the
period between the signing of the consent election agreement and the
election is generally between fifteen and thirty days,5 9 whereas Wave I
54. Symposium, Four Perspectives on Union Representation Elections: Law and
Reality, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1976).
55. Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, at 25, 94 L.R.R.M.
1705, 1712 (Apr. 8, 1977).
56. GETMAN STUDY, at 33-34.
57. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1976) (NLRB Statements of Procedure).
58. 40 NLRB ANN. REP. 16 (1975).
59. GETMAN STUDY, at 2.
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interviews began an average of only eleven days before the election. 60
Thus, there was ample time for campaigning prior to Wave I inter-
views.
The authors report that little campaigning occurred between "the
card signing drive" and the direction of the election. 6' They acknowl-
edge that "some campaigning" did take place between the direction of
the election and the Wave I interviews, but, contrary to these sugges-
tions their statistics indicate that unions held only fifty-one percent of
their meetings and distributed only sixty-four percent of their written
materials after those interviews.6 2 Their text does not state that "the
card signing drive" was a part of the union campaign, but this re-
viewer has been informed that it was.63
This opportunity for pre-Wave I campaigning during "the card
signing drive" is particularly important when consideration is given to
the labor relations policies of the companies included in the study.
The authors state that the primary basis for selecting the thirty-one
companies studied was "the likelihood of vigorous, possibly unlawful
campaigning. '6 4 (That the elections differed somewhat from the norm
is indicated by the fact that the unions won only one quarter of
them,65 whereas unions ordinarily win about one half of NLRB elec-
tions.66) The indicators which the authors used to identify companies
as likely to engage in vigorous campaigning were probably also
known to the employees of those companies,6 7 who were thereby sen-
sitized to problems of unionization. The "card signing drive" neces-
sarily involved a substantial amount of personal contact (which the
authors found to be a particularly effective campaign tactic for both
sides). This could have shaped and rigidified the pro-union attitudes of
60. Id.at69n.18.
61. Id. at 69.
62. Id.
63. Telephone interview with Professor Julius Getman (one of the authors)
(July 26, 1977).
64. GETMAN STUDY, at 34.
65. Id. at 102.
66. 41 NLRB ANN. REP. 17 (1976).
67. The factors included "the strength of the employer's opposition to union-
ization," "whether the employer had engaged in unlawful practices in prior
elections," "the views of employer and union representatives as to the likely nature
of this campaign," and "whether the law firm representing the employer had a
reputation, for representing employers who campaigned strongly and sometimes
unlawfully." Getman Study at 34-35. Professor Getman informed the reviewer in a
telephone conversation that the latter factor was given the greatest weight by the
authors.
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the employees with a result that later overt and public campaigning
had little effect on the predispositions existing at the time of the Wave
I interviews. Those employees who had been intimidated or coerced
by the known hostility of the employer might already have succumbed
to that pressure, resolving the problem of the cognitive dissonance
between their view of themselves as persons of integrity and independ-
ence and their fear of employer reprisals by concluding that they were
in basic and fundamental agreement with the employer. For these
employees, the subsequent pre-election campaign accordingly would
be of little importance. Those persons who successfully resisted the
employer's pressure remained true to their convictions, and the cam-
paigning would likewise be of little significance. 68
This analysis suggests that the study might be valid only for em-
ployers whose prior conduct suggests the likelihood of vigorous and
possibly unlawful campaigning. I do not know (nor does the NLRB)
what effect an unexpected demonstration of employer hostility would
have on the predispositions of employees. My empirically unvalidated
hunch is that the effect would be greater than the reaffirmance of that
hostility was for the employees in the companies studied, but that it
likewise would not be consistent with the NLRB's assumptions. The
discounting factor for the validity of the study is the extent to which
employees generally do not anticipate that unionization will meet with
employer hostility and use of known economic force. If employees
generally anticipate hostility and use of economic force, the study is
valid despite its use of elections in which such conduct was predict-
able.
Another factor which may have distorted the study results deserves
mention. To facilitate the process of interviewing employees promptly
after the election, all of the employees interviewed in Wave I were
sent a post card reminding them that they would be interviewed again
at the day and time agreed upon in the Wave I interview.69 Undoubt-
edly, the reminder facilitated the Wave II interviews. But I suggest,
again without supporting empirical data, that such a reminder of a
forthcoming interview may have prompted at least some employees to
vote in accordance with the views they expressed during the first inter-
68. Indeed, the authors recognized this possibility. Id. at 129.
69. Id. at 46.
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view, thus enhancing the apparent importance of predispositions in
determining the ultimate vote.
Despite these reservations, the findings of the study should not and
have not been dismissed as inconsequential. It is important to re-
member that most of the study is directed to the Board's election
rules, rather than to the law of unfair labor practices. The Board ad-
heres to the proposition that parties who proceed with a consent or
stipulated election waive all objections to conduct which preceded the
filing of a petition for an election.70 Much may be said for such a doc-
trine in terms of conserving the resources of the Board and sparing
parties the burden of elections held at unpropitious times. The ques-
tion thus is not whether the Board should approve employer conduct
which results in pro-company predispositions, but whether the con-
duct which occurs after the filing of a petition should be the basis for
setting aside the election.
It is something of a triumph that the authors have already suc-
ceeded in Shopping Kart in getting the NLRB to reconsider an elec-
tion rule which had considerable importance even though the recon-
sideration was accomplished by a divided majority of three. The im-
pending resignation of Board member Walther,7 who voted with one
majority, may reduce the decision to a position of relative insignific-
ance, but whether this will occur depends upon the views of his suc-
cessor. In any event, the change was probably the one which could
best be made with confidence on the basis of the study.
In Shopping Kart,72 the Board examined the rule enunciated in
Hollywood Ceramics Co.,73 to the effect that an election would be
set aside if any party to the election made a substantial misstatement
of facts within the special knowledge of the party so shortly before the
election that there was no effective time for reply. Application of that
rule necessarily involved the Board in making determinations of the
truth or falsity of campaign propaganda, and thus limited the freedom
of speech of the parties involved in the elections. It also provided op-
70. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453 (1962).
71. Board Member Walther announced his decision to resign from the NLRB
for personal reasons on March 31, 1977. 94 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 299 (Apr. 11,
1977). Nevertheless, he has continued to serve on the Board. 95 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 402 (Aug. 22, 1977).
72. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (Apr. 8, 1977).
73. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
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portunities for parties dissatisfied with election results to challenge
those results on the basis of what they deemed to be objectionable and
false campaign statements of opposing parties. These objections to the
Hollywood Ceramics rule were pointed out as early as 1964 by then
Professor Bok,74 and were more recently restated in the extensive
study of Williams, Janus, and Huhn.75
After noting these more traditional academic criticisms of NLRB
doctrine, members Pennello and Walther turned their attention to the
authors' study. They noted that the study cast doubt upon the assump-
tion that employees are unsophisticated about labor relations and that
the campaign influenced the majority of employees to vote contrary to
their predispositions. Finding the assumptions underlying the Holly-
wood Ceramics rule to be "dubious at best," they concluded that the
rule did more to frustrate free choice than to serve it. Accordingly,
they decided that elections should no longer be set aside on the basis
of misleading statements by the employer or the union. The extent of
their conversion by the study should not be overestimated because
they maintained that elections would be set aside where a party en-
gaged in deceptive practices involving Board processes, and they as-
serted that they would continue the policy of overseeing other cam-
paign conduct which interferes with employee free choice outside the
area of misrepresentation.76 Then Chairman Murphy, whose vote was
necessary to make the majority, emphasized in a concurring opinion
her belief that elections should be set aside when a party makes an
"egregious mistake [sic] of fact ' 77 or when use is made of threats,
promises of benefit, or similar improprieties.78 There were two dissen-
ters, the present Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, the force of
whose dissents suggest that they will attempt to correct what they view
as aberrational conduct.
The authors suggest a much more comprehensive revision of NLRB
election law than that embraced by the Board majority. They con-
clude that neither threats of reprisal nor promises of benefit should
74. Bok, supra note 6. Derek Bok is now president of Harvard University.
75. REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT, supra note 2.
76. Member Walther has stated in a speech before the Bar of Texas in
Houston on June 17, 1977, that Shopping Kart has no bearing upon employer
freedom to make threats or engage in intimidating conduct. 95 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 205, 207 (July 11, 1977).
77. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, at 11, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1708 (Apr. 8, 1977).
78. Id.
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constitute a basis for setting aside an NLRB election.79 In reaching
this conclusion they note that union supporters are generally not de-
terred by threats or promises, and that nearly all employees believe
their vote is secret. They also conclude that interrogation of em-
ployees concerning union activities should not constitute either an
unfair labor practice or grounds for setting aside an election.8 0 In a
catch-all conclusion, they recommend that the NLRB abandon all of
the rules which it has developed to preserve "laboratory conditions"
for an election.81 (Illustrative is the Peerless Plywood82 rule making
speeches to massed assembled employees during the twenty-four hour
period preceding an election a basis for setting aside the results of that
election.) They also propose that a grant of benefits should not consti-
tute either an unfair labor practice or basis for setting aside an elec-
tion,83 nor would they make denial of benefits or unlawful discharge a
basis for setting .aside an election, although they would provide pro-
tection to the victims of such discriminatory conduct.84
In lieu of setting aside elections, the authors suggest internal discip-
line for Board employees whose conduct damages the appearance of
fairness, and specific statutory prohibitions against other objection-
able conduct on the part of the parties.8 5 They view with considerable
skepticism the use of bargaining orders as remedies for unlawful em-
ployer campaign tactics, suggesting instead that such conduct could
better be deterred, for example, by requiring employers to pay discri-
minatorily discharged employees three times their lost earnings.86
Counterbalancing the recommendations that protections of unions
and union-minded employees be removed, is the suggestion that an
employer who holds campaign meetings on working time and prem-
ises be required to allow the union to hold similar meetings on
working time and premises.87 As they see it, this requirement is partic-
79. GETMAN STuDy, at 147-48.
80. Id. at 149.
81. The authors make a more modest proposal-that the Board decline to
consider objections based on speech in those cases in which the margin of victory
is greater than 20% of the vote. Id. at 150 n.21. They question whether this more
modest reform would have any meaningful impact because if the margin is
greater than 20% the loser is not likely to file objections.
82. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
83. GETMAN Srtuoy, at 151.
84. Id. at 151-52.
85. Id. at 152-53.
86. Id. at 153-56.
87. Id. at 157.
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ularly appropriate if restrictions on employer speech are removed as
they recommend.
The program proposed by the authors first evokes, for those im-
bued with the traditions of NLRB law, something of the surprise of
Alice to the curious logic of the world beyond the looking glass. One
recognizes the logic, but it seems unreal. Can one embrace their prop-
ositions if as many as nineteen percent of the voters' choice for repre-
sentation could not be predicted before the pre-election campaigning?
Those votes, as noted above, did decide almost one-third of the elec-
tions. Departure from the current standards on the basis of the con-
trolling effect of predispositions seems particularly troublesome when
consideration is given to the high percentage of continued company
loyalty on the part of employees of companies selected for the study
because of the likelihood that the employers would engage in vigor-
ous, possibly unlawful campaigning. The employers performed as
predicted, and in doing so won approximately seventy-five percent of
the elections as compared to the norm of fifty percent. Is it really in-
significant that only ten percent of those employees intending to vote
for the company thought there was a job-loss theme in the company's
campaign, that only nineteen percent of those intending to vote for the
company thought there had been promises of benefit for rejecting
unionization, or that a lesser percentage of company supporters than
union supporters said they viewed discharges as motivated by hostility
to unions?
Those who believe that the authors have the burden of proving the
current assumptions to be wrong will probably answer these questions
in the negative. But have not the authors raised enough doubt about
the validity of the current assumptions to require reconsideration of
the current rules of NLRB law? If the study casts doubts upon
whether certain types of employer conduct affect employee free-
dom of choice or interfere with the establishment of collective
bargaining, the costs of current Board actions to the parties involved
as well as to the public must be weighed. If the costs are significant,
the Board should no longer pursue a course which only doubtfully
protects employee freedom of choice and the institution of collective
bargaining.
In any event, it is now clear that the NLRB should undertake its
own empirical studies to validate the assumptions upon which it pro-
ceeds. It is not enough to find fault with the study conducted by the
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authors. Even if they have erred in certain respects, their study has so
shaken the underpinnings of current Board law that uncritical contin-
uation of past practices is unacceptable. The current prohibition
against research activities of Board employees reaches only to "eco-
nomic analysis, ' 88 and would not prohibit a study of the sort con-
ducted by the authors. The results of such studies could be publicized
and provide the basis for proposed rulemaking hearings, in which
parties to be affected by the rules would have an opportunity to com-
ment upon the validity of the study data as well as the wisdom of the
rule proposed.8 9
Neither the opinions in Shopping Kart, nor the Board's record of
use of empirical studies and rulemaking proceedings creates much
confidence that the Board will undertake the needed studies. Perhaps
the study will have greater effect by inducing courts to require the
NLRB to do more than rely upon a mythical expertise now demon-
strated to be at best questionable hunches.
If further empirical studies are made to provide a solid foundation
for Board rules, those in the labor-management field will be much
indebted to the authors for their efforts. It is to be hoped, however,
that the effects of the study will not be limited to the specialized field
of labor relations. Indeed, the authors have given a persuasive demon-
stration of the need for empirical research in many areas of law in
which rules have been fashioned and followed on the basis of the un-
validated hunches of deciding authorities, both administrative and
judicial. Does the Federal Trade Commission have an empirical basis
for its determinations of what kind of advertising misleads customers?
How much does the public understand of the information required to
be published by regulations promulgated under truth-in-lending legis-
lation? How does the Federal Communications Commission decide
what sort of programming proposal makes an applicant for a televi-
sion license the one to be preferred in the public interest if it has not
attempted by empirical studies to determine the effects of program-
ming on society or what the public desires or would desire if offered
alternatives to what the industry currently produces? What use is
made of drugs which are available in over-the-counter sales? How
88. 29 U.S.C. §'154(a) (1970).
89. For a careful consideration of how the Board might make use of empiri-
cal studies, see Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regu-
lation: A Proposal, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1441 (1977).
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have welfare agencies responded to the requirement of due process
hearings in revocation of welfare benefits? Do recipients of lump-sum
settlements under workmen's compensation statutes have a better
record of rehabilitation than those who are awarded pensions for
permanent partial disabilities? Obviously, many more such questions
could be asked and profitably researched.
The years invested by the authors in their study warn that empirical
research is not easily undertaken or accomplished. Nor will comple-
tion of empirical studies eliminate arguments about what the law
should be,90 or who should change it.91 But the authors deserve our
appreciation for having so effectively demonstrated the need for em-
pirical research in lieu of unvalidated hunches.
90. See, e.g., A. CONRAD, R. BOMBAUGH, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, & C. VOLTZ, AUTO-
MOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1964); Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury,
50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964); Peck, Compensation for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light
of New Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1355 (1974); Peck, An Exercise Based
Upon Empirical Data: Liability for Harm Caused by Stolen Automobiles, 1969 Wis.
L. REV. 909; Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After"
Survey, 13 ARK. L. REV. 89 (1959); Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Em-
pirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 743 (1968).
91. See Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort
Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1963).
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